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I
n the past twenty years dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models have taken
center stage in academic macroeconomic
research. The stated goal of DSGE models in
the tradition of Kydland and Prescott (1982)
is to explain business cycle features of the
data and to be usable for quantitative—as opposed to
only qualitative—policy analysis. Yet until recently
the data that these models have been measured
against are not the GDP or inflation figures that
appear in newspapers but so-called filtered data.
One commonly used filter, the Hodrick-Prescott
(1997) filter, decomposes the data into a cyclical
component and a growth component and removes
the latter. By doing so the filter removes from the
data variations that are due to frequencies other
than business cycle frequencies. One rationale
behind the filtering is that the model is designed to
explain business cycles as opposed to very short-run
(say, seasonal) or long-run movements (say, due to
demographics) in the data. Hence, it seems logical
to assess the model’s fit in terms of that part of the
data that it can explain. 
Whatever the motivation behind using filtered
data, filtering has two important consequences. First,
it implies that the task of forecasting macroeco-
nomic time series stays outside the realm of DSGE
models and is left entirely to econometric models or
judgmental forecasters. Practitioners are interested
in forecasts of actual, as opposed to filtered, data,
so they rely on models, or individuals, that deliver
such forecasts. The second consequence of using
filtered data is that, to this day, policymakers rarely
use general equilibrium models, at least in quantita-
tive analysis. Like practitioners, policymakers base
their decisions on forecasts of macroeconomic time
series. Policymakers want to know, for instance, the
expected path of inflation, unemployment, or real
output growth in the next few quarters and by how
much a 25 basis point cut in the federal funds rate
would change such a path. Since very little is known
about the forecasting performance of general equi-
librium models, policymakers rarely rely on them
for quantitative policy assessment. 
Many of the models currently used in forecasting
and policy analysis belong to one of two categories.
The first includes models in the Cowles Commission
tradition.1 These are large-scale simultaneous equa-
tion models that were prominent in macroeconom-
ics before the rational expectations revolution, from
the late 1950s to the early 1970s (see Diebold 1998
for a brief history of macroeconomic forecasting).
These models have been updated to incorporate
rational expectations and are still heavily used for
forecasting and policy-making by central banks
around the world as well as by commercial fore-
casters.2 FRB/US—the workhorse model of policy
analysis at the Federal Reserve Board of Governors—
is one of them.3 The second category of models
includes vector autoregressions (VARs), which were
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ifications that are consistent with a dynamic general
equilibrium. In fact, a linearized DSGE model can be
closely approximated by a VAR with a sufficiently
large number of lags. The VAR parameters can, in
principle, be constrained to be functions of deep
parameters for some DSGE model. Typically, however,
VARs are not estimated under such constraints, and
therefore the VAR parameter estimates cannot be
interpreted in terms of deep parameters.
This article reviews some recent attempts to use
general equilibrium models for forecasting and policy
analysis. In particular, the article focuses on one spe-
cific approach, pioneered by Ingram and Whiteman
(1994) and further developed by Del Negro and
Schorfheide (forthcoming), that relies on the use of
general equilibrium models as priors for Bayesian
VARs. To motivate this approach, which we will call
DSGE-VAR, we first need to address two questions.
First, why should one bother to forecast with gen-
eral equilibrium models? Second, why should one
use general equilibrium models as priors instead of
forecasting directly with them? The next two sec-
tions address these questions. 
Why Forecast with DSGE Models? 
T
here are two good reasons to use DSGE models in
forecasting (also see Diebold 1998 for a discussion
of forecasting with DSGE models). The first reason
has to do with improving the forecasting precision.
It is well known that loosely parameterized models,
such as VARs, are imprecisely estimated unless a very
long time series of data is available, which is rarely the
case in macroeconomics. Imprecise estimates in turn
result in potentially large forecast errors, especially for
long forecast horizons. A solution to this problem of
too many parameters is to use Bayesian priors. In
Bayesian econometrics a prior on a set of parameters
is a distribution that summarizes beliefs or knowledge
about these parameters prior (whence the name) to
observing the data. Priors reduce the sample variabil-
ity in the parameter estimates by “shrinking” them
toward a specific point in the parameter space. For
this reason, since the seminal work of Litterman
(1986) and Doan, Litterman, and Sims (1984), BVARs
have earned a reputation for forecasting accuracy
(see Robertson and Tallman 1999 for a review of the
comparative forecasting accuracy of BVARs). In many
BVARs the priors arise from statistics, namely, from
the observation that random walk processes describe
quite well the behavior of a number of macroeco-
nomic time series.6 This observation is the rationale,
for instance, for the well-known Minnesota prior. The
Minnesota prior shrinks the VAR parameters toward
a unit root. Ingram and Whiteman (1994) proposed
introduced by Sims (1980) in the early 1980s and
popularized in the forecasting literature by Litterman
(1986). The BVAR model (a VAR with Bayesian
priors) used for forecasting at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta belongs to this second category.4
Like VARs and Cowles Commission models, DSGE
models also aspire to describe the data. Perhaps the
main difference between DSGE models on the one
side and VARs and Cowles Commission models on
the other side is that DSGE models are explicitly
derived from first principles. That is, DSGE models
describe the general equilibrium allocations and
prices of a model economy in which agents (house-
holds, firms, financial intermediaries, etc.) dynami-
cally maximize their objectives (utility, profits, and
so on) subject to their budget and resource con-
straints. The DSGE model parameters describe the
preferences of agents (tastes), the production func-
tion (technology), and other features of the economy.
These parameters are called “deep” parameters—
parameters that do not vary with policy. 
To be sure, economic theory also informs Cowles
Commission–style models and VARs. For instance,
most equations in Cowles Commission–style models,
such as consumption equations, investment equa-
tions, and so on, are inspired by economic analysis, if
not explicitly derived from it. However, in some cases
the parameters of these models characterize behavior
instead of tastes and technologies. Yet the agents’
behavior is not policy invariant, and therefore not all
parameters in such models are deep.5 The modelers
typically adopt a block-by-block approach (in which
the blocks are the household sector, the business
sector, etc.; see Brayton, Levin, et al. 1997; Brayton,
Mauskopf, et al. 1997) to describe the various agents
and sectors in the economy and often ignore impor-
tant links among blocks. In particular, when forming
expectations, agents in these models often ignore
equilibrium restrictions that must hold in all future
states of the world. VARs were introduced by Sims
(1980) with the intent to overcome the deficiencies of
the Cowles Commission approach and to obtain spec-
The stated goal of DSGE models in the tradition
of Kydland and Prescott (1982) is to explain
business cycle features of the data and to be
usable for quantitative policy analysis.1. The Cowles Commission (now the Cowles Foundation) was founded by Alfred Cowles in 1932 to promote quantitative
research in economics. The Cowles Commission and its fellows played a pivotal role in promoting and developing large-scale
econometric models. Hence, its name became associated with the approach (see Fair 1992).
2. Sims (2002) provides a criticism of the way Cowles Commission–style models are currently being estimated and used for
policy analysis.
3. See Brayton, Mauskopf, et al. (1997) and Brayton, Levin, et al. (1997) for a description of FRB/US and Reifschneider,
Stockton, and Wilcox (1997) for a description of forecasting and policy evaluation at the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
4. See Zha (1998) for a discussion of the use of VARs in policy analysis.
5. Production functions and utility functions underpin the equations for many sectors of models like FRB/US, however. As a
result, one may be able to back out some of the deep parameters from the coefficient estimates.
6. A random walk is a process in which today’s best guess about tomorrow’s value of a variable is today’s value, possibly augmented
by a constant.
7. This assumption is not true for all tax policy changes: Some changes may affect spending on research and development and
therefore future technology. However, as a first approximation this effect can be ignored for many policy changes.
8. See Sims (1982), Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996), and Sargent (1984) for a discussion of the relevance of the Lucas critique for VARs.
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to use a prior that comes from a general equilibrium
model, namely, a standard real business cycle (RBC)
model. Ingram and Whiteman show that the perfor-
mance of their VAR with an RBC prior in terms of fore-
casting real variables (real output, consumption, and
investment growth) is comparable to that of a VAR
with a Minnesota prior.
The second reason for forecasting with DSGE mod-
els has to do with evaluating the impact of changes in
policy. The well-known Lucas (1976) critique implies
that only models in which the parameters are deep—
that is, models in which the parameters do not vary
with policy—are suited to evaluate the impact of pol-
icy changes. To understand why this is the case, let
us consider a model in which the parameters are
not deep; this may be a VAR or a Cowles Commission
model. The forecaster who uses such a model to pre-
dict the effect of a given policy change faces the fol-
lowing dilemma. On the one hand, she can estimate the
parameters of the model only on the basis of past data
and experiences. On the other hand, unless the policy
change has occurred before, she can gain little guid-
ance from past experience about how the policy
change affects the decision rules of agents and hence
how it affects the parameters of the model. 
For example, suppose that the goal is to predict
the effects of the 2003 change in the tax code. A
forecaster might use the data available prior to the
policy change to estimate a consumption equation
that describes the behavior of consumers as a func-
tion of a number of variables, including wealth and
disposable income. Knowing the amount by which
wealth and disposable income will be increased by
the tax breaks, the forecaster may use the estimated
relationship to forecast consumption in the next few
quarters. However, the Lucas argument is that the
change in policy may induce agents to change their
behavior, which in turn may change the relationship
between wealth, disposable income, and consump-
tion. For instance, the tax break may affect the agents’
propensity to consume. Hence, the forecast for con-
sumption may well turn out to be wrong.
Now suppose that the model being used to fore-
cast the impact of the policy change is a DSGE
model. In a DSGE model the parameters are truly
deep, that is, invariant with policy, or at least they
are assumed to be so. For instance, there is no reason
to think that a change in the tax policy would affect
either the extent to which people enjoy leisure
(tastes) or the current speed of computers (tech-
nology).7 Therefore the forecaster can estimate
these parameters using existing data and does not
have to worry that they may change with policy.
Once the parameters are available, the forecaster
can solve the model and work out the impact of the
tax change on consumption. For instance, the fore-
caster using DSGE models can correctly compute
agents’ propensity to consume under the new policy.
If the specification of the DSGE model is appropriate,
the effect of the new policy can be correctly evalu-
ated even though it has not occurred in the past. 
Of course, the distinction just drawn between
models with and without deep parameters is
Manichaean. First, not all parameters in DSGE
models are necessarily deep, so some DSGE models
may be subject to the same criticism as the other
models. Second, not all policy changes result in dra-
matic changes in agents’ behavior. In such cases,
models other than DSGE models may well be able
to provide reliable forecasts.8 With these important
caveats established, one of the main implications of
the Lucas critique is that DSGE models have in
principle an important advantage over other models
in forecasting the effects of policy changes.
Why Use Priors?
T
he advantages of DSGE models discussed in the
previous section often come at a cost in terms38 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2003
real output growth, inflation, and the short-term
interest rate), the procedure amounts to generating
λT observations for real output growth, inflation, and
the federal funds rate from the DSGE model; combin-
ing these dummy observations with the actual data;
and running a VAR on the augmented data set.9
The DSGE-VAR procedure assumes that the
dynamics for the data to be forecast are reasonably
well described by an unrestricted VAR. To the extent
that these dynamics are linear and that the VAR has
a sufficient number of lags, this is not a very heroic
assumption: VARs are parameterized loosely enough
to accommodate nearly any linear stochastic process.
As discussed above, the problem is precisely that
VARs have too many parameters, so the estimates
may be imprecise in short samples. Our approach
starts from the premise that a DSGE model may
provide useful restrictions for the VAR parameters—
useful in the sense that the restrictions can improve
the model’s forecasting performance. We do not want
to impose these restrictions dogmatically for the
reasons described in the previous section. Rather,
we treat the DSGE model as prior information in the
estimation. As is well known since the work of Theil
and Goldberger (1961), one way to incorporate prior
information into the estimation is to augment the
sample with dummy observations that reflect the
prior (see also Sims and Zha 1998). This is precisely
the route we follow: Our dummy observations are
simply data generated by the DSGE model. 
The next step in the procedure consists of esti-
mating the VAR parameters using both the actual
and the dummy observations. To make this step clear,
we specify some notation. Y is the T × n matrix of
actual data, where T is the sample size and n is the
number of variables. X is the matrix of VAR regres-
sors, which includes the constant as well as the lags
of the variables. The VAR, which we assume to be
the data-generating process, is given by
(1) Y = XΦ + U,
where U is the T × n matrix of VAR innovations,
which are normally distributed with mean 0 and
variance Σu. The standard OLS estimator for Φ is
given by the well-known formula
(2) ΦOLS = (X′X)–1X′Y.
Now  λT observations are generated for the vari-
ables of interest from the DSGE model. As men-
tioned above, λ is the weight of the prior. So if T= 100
and λ = 0.5, this step generates fifty observations
from the DSGE model. Using these dummy observa-
of the model’s fit. A number of papers that study
the fit of DSGE models (for example, Altug 1989;
Leeper and Sims 1994; Ireland 1997; Schorfheide
2000) find that this fit is far from perfect. As dis-
cussed above, economic theory imposes a number
of restrictions on the stochastic process followed by
the data—the cross-equation restrictions that are
the hallmark of rational expectations econometrics.
These restrictions imply that DSGE models are
scarcely parameterized compared with VARs or
Cowles Commission–style models. Hence, DSGE
models may match the data in many important
dimensions but, being overly simplified model
economies, may also fail in several other dimensions,
resulting in large forecast errors for some of the
variables of interest.
If one wants to forecast with general equilibrium
models, using them indirectly as priors may be
preferable to the alternative approach of forecast-
ing directly with them. Using general equilibrium
models as priors means that the restrictions stem-
ming from economic theory are imposed loosely
instead of rigidly. This method implies that the final
(posterior) stochastic process used to forecast will
respect the restrictions in those dimensions where
these restrictions are not rejected by the data but
may otherwise depart from them. Of course, if the
restrictions are too loosely imposed there is virtually
no difference between forecasting with general equi-
librium priors and with an unrestricted VAR (a VAR
without priors). Therefore, a key input in the process
is the “degree of tightness”—which will be denoted
hereafter as λ and which ranges from 0 (no prior) to
∞ (rigid restrictions). The remainder of the article
will describe how to choose λ optimally.
How Does DSGE-VAR Work?
T
he discussion in this section offers an intuitive
exposition of the procedure in Del Negro and
Schorfheide (forthcoming) for using DSGE models
as priors in VARs. Assuming that T observations are
available for the variables to be forecast (for instance,
One of the main implications of the Lucas
critique is that DSGE models have in principle
an important advantage over other models in
forecasting the effects of policy changes.9. See Del Negro and Schorfheide (forthcoming) for an econometrically detailed description of the approach as well as an appendix
on how the procedure works in practice.
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tions, the matrices Y* and X* are constructed. Finally,
the OLS estimates are run again on the augmented
dataset that includes both actual and dummy obser-
vations, yielding the estimator
(3) ΦDSGE-VAR = (X′X + X*′X*)–1(X′Y + X*′Y*).
This estimator will be used in forecasting.
Now that the formula is determined, a few com-
ments are in order. First, we want to elaborate on
the role of λ, the weight of the prior. Notice that the
previous formula can be equivalently expressed as
(4) Φλ
DSGE-VAR = 
The terms (X′X)/T  and (X′Y)/T are the second
moments (that is, say, the covariance between real
output growth today and interest rates in the previ-
ous period) computed from the data. The terms
(X*′X*)/λT and (X*′Y*)/λT are the second moments
implied by the DSGE model. Our proposed estimator
is computed by weighting the second moments from
the data with the second moments implied by the
DSGE model, with weights that are respectively
1/(1 + λ) and 1 – 1/(1 + λ). If λ = 0, the dummy
observations disappear from the formula: Since for
λ = 0 we are using only the second moments from the
data, the estimator in this case coincides with the OLS
estimator. If λ = ∞, the weight on the dummy obser-
vations becomes 1. Thus, for λ = ∞ the restrictions
coming from the DSGE model are rigidly imposed. 
Next, we introduce an important refinement into
the procedure. Whenever λT is not too large (say, λ =
1/10, and T = 100), we generate a small number of
dummy observations (in the above example, λT=10).
Because of sample variability in the Monte Carlo pro-
cedure that generates the dummy observation from
the DSGE model, whenever λT is small the sample
second moments, the terms (X*′X*)/λT and (X*′Y*)/
λT, may provide a poor estimate of the population
second moments that the DSGE model implies. One
way around the problem is to compute the terms
(X*′X*)/λT and (X*′Y*)/λT a large number of times
and then average across realizations. This way of
proceeding has the disadvantage of being computa-
tionally expensive because one would have to draw













































alternative approach and exploit the fact that when-
ever the DSGE model is linear (or is well approx-
imated by a linear solution) the population second
moments, which we call Γ*
xx and Γ*
xy, can be com-
puted analytically. Hence, in the formula for the
estimator ΦDSGE-VAR, we use the population moments
Γ*
xx and Γ*
xy in place of (X*′X*)/λT and (X*′Y*)/λT.
Up to this point we have not mentioned the values
taken by the deep parameters (preferences, etc.) of
the DSGE model. We denote with θ the vector of
deep parameters. Clearly, the population moments
Γ*
xx and Γ*
xy, and hence our estimator ΦDSGE-VAR, will
depend on the choice of θ. To make this depen-
dence explicit, we rewrite the estimator as
(5) Φλ(θ)DSGE-VAR=
In the macro literature that follows Kydland and
Prescott (1982), a popular approach for choosing
θ is calibration (see Kydland and Prescott 1996).
Calibration amounts to selecting the values of θ on
the basis of information other than that contained in
the data we want the model to explain (or forecast).
This information may come from microeconomic
studies as well as from long-run empirical relation-
ships, such as the labor share of national income or
the consumption-output ratio. 
We choose to depart from calibration and estimate
θ; that is, we let the value of θ be determined by the
data we want to fit. We do so on the grounds that if
the calibration exercise is poorly performed, or if
there is little outside information to pin down some
of the elements of θ, the forecasting performance of
DSGE-VAR may be severely affected. Still, in order
to take advantage of useful outside information (micro
studies and so on), we incorporate prior information
into the estimation of θ. 
How do we learn about θ from the data in our
procedure? From equation (1), the data depend on
the VAR parameters, not on θ. The answer is that we
learn about θ indirectly, via the estimator ΦDSGE-VAR.
As emphasized in equation (5), as long as λ is greater
than zero, the choice of θ affects ΦDSGE-VAR. From
the data we learn which ΦDSGE-VAR has the best fit.
But since for each choice of ΦDSGE-VAR there corre-
sponds a choice for θ, we can go back and learn










































θ40 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2003
which is a function of the number of parameters to
be estimated. The penalty term avoids the problem
of the data being overfitted. The choice of λ works
similarly, except that complexity cannot be deter-
mined by a simple parameter count (the number
of VAR parameters is the same for all values of λ).
We measure complexity as the degree of uncer-
tainty associated with the parameter estimates. For
instance, for λ = 0 the resulting estimator Φ0
DSGE-VAR
coincides with ΦOLS, which is fairly imprecise. In
this case we are using a large penalty. The higher λ,
the more the estimator Φλ
DSGE-VAR is pulled toward
the restrictions imposed by the DSGE model and
the lower its variance. Hence, for large λ, the penalty
that is used to adjust the measure of in-sample fit is
small. Overall, if the DSGE model restrictions are
very much at odds with the data, one would prefer
the uncertainty and choose a low λ. If, however, the
model is good, in the sense that the restrictions it
imposes are not grossly at odds with the data, then
one may welcome the reduction in uncertainty and
choose a high value for λ. 
In Bayesian terminology, our measure of fit coin-
cides with the marginal likelihood, which is the
integral of the likelihood function over all possible
parameter values, weighted by the prior density.
The marginal likelihood can be approximated by a
penalized likelihood function as described above.
We use the (exact) marginal data density to find the
optimal value of λ (see Del Negro and Schorfheide,
forthcoming, section 3.3.1).
The DSGE Model Used to Generate 
the Artificial Data
T
he methodology behind DSGE-VAR is general,
so it does not depend on the specific DSGE
model that is chosen. Of course, the better the
DSGE model, in the sense that it captures the
important features of the economy, the higher the
weight λ it should receive in the composition of the
augmented sample. We apply our procedure to a
fairly standard and simple neo-Keynesian DSGE
model. This section very briefly describes the model
(see Del Negro and Schorfheide, forthcoming,
section 2, for further details). 
When written in log-linearized form (that is, all
the variables are expressed in percentage devia-
tions from their stochastic steady state), the model
boils down to the following three equations: 
1. an IS curve relating real output (xt) to the level
of the real interest rate, computed as the nomi-
nal rate minus expected inflation (Rt – Etπt+1), as
well as to technology shocks (zt), government
that is, whenever the restrictions coming from the
DSGE model are imposed rigidly, our estimator for
θ coincides with Smith’s (1993) SQML (simulated
quasi-maximum likelihood) estimator.
How Much Should the DSGE Prior Matter?
T
he discussion in the previous section empha-
sized that the choice of λ is crucial in the esti-
mation. Our procedure does not require the fore-
caster to have strong a priori views on the choice of
λ—that is, to pick λ ex ante. Rather, as the fore-
caster learns about θ from the data, she can also
learn about λ. This section shows how λ can be esti-
mated endogenously.
The intuition about how to choose λ is the same
as the one given in the previous section on the esti-
mation of θ. Again, the data do not depend on λ but
only on the VAR parameters. However, as formula
(5) shows, the estimator ΦDSGE-VAR crucially depends
on the choice of λ. To make this explicit, let us write
Φλ
DSGE-VAR (for simplicity, in this section we abstract
from the choice of θ, which we can think of as fixed). If
λ tends to infinity, the resulting estimator Φ∞
DSGE-VAR
will conform to the restrictions imposed by the DSGE
model. Otherwise, it will not. To the extent that the
restrictions coming from the DSGE model lead to an
estimator that fits the data well, the procedure
points toward choosing a high value for λ. 
In the above discussion, the definition of “fit”
must be clarified. Fit does not simply correspond to
large values of the likelihood function or small val-
ues of the in-sample sum-of-squared residuals. It is
clear that the unrestricted estimator (λ = 0) always
beats the restricted estimator (λ > 0) in terms of in-
sample fit: A constrained optimum cannot fare any
better than the unconstrained optimum. What we
have in mind is the fit of the model, taking into
account the model complexity. Consider the prob-
lem of choosing the lag length for a regular VAR. A
popular criterion for lag-length selection is the
Schwarz criterion. It penalizes the maximized likeli-
hood function by a measure of model complexity,
DSGE-VAR addresses regime shifts, trying to
strike a balance between the forecasting
accuracy of BVARs and the compliance to
the Lucas critique of DSGE models.10. For real output growth and inflation, the quantities being forecast are cumulative. In other words, for a sixteen-quarter horizon
we are trying to forecast the average real output growth in the next four years as opposed to the rate of growth of the economy
exactly sixteen quarters from now. Results obtained using the noncumulative forecasts deliver the same conclusion, however.
11. Other details of the exercise, such as the prior used for θ, are described in Del Negro and Schorfheide (forthcoming).
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spending shocks (gt), and expectations of future
real activity (Etxt+1):
(6) xt = Etxt+1 – τ–1(Rt – Etπt+1) 
+ (1– ρg) gt + ρzτ–1zt,
where τ, ρg, and ρz measure the agents’ relative
risk aversion and the degree of persistence of gov-
ernment and technology shocks, respectively;
2. a Phillips curve relating current inflation (πt) to
expectations of future inflation (Etπt+1), output,
and government spending: 
(7) πt = βEtπt+1 + κ(xt – gt),
where κ measures the slope of the Phillips curve
and is a function of deep parameters of the
model; and
3. a Taylor rule, by which the monetary authority
reacts to deviations of inflation from target and
of output from potential output when setting the
interest rate, Rt:
(8) Rt = ρRRt–1 + (1 – ρR)(ψ1πt + ψ2xt) + εRt,
where ρR is the degree of persistence of mone-
tary shocks and where the coefficients ψ1 and ψ2




he introduction to this article stressed the
importance of forecasting, both for practition-
ers and policymakers. This section investigates the
forecasting performance of DSGE-VAR in terms of
three of the variables that most interest monetary
policymakers: real output growth, inflation, and the
federal funds rate. The reader must bear in mind
that the results presented in this section are partic-
ular to the specific DSGE model described in the
previous section. More elaborate models may gen-
erate different—and possibly better—results.
Nonetheless, it is important to assess how DSGE-VAR
fares when applied to a very simple model, if only
for comparison. 
In this section we specifically address two ques-
tions. First, is the DSGE prior useful in terms of fore-
casting? In other words, does the presence of the
DSGE prior increase the forecasting performance
relative to that of an unrestricted VAR? This ques-
tion amounts to asking whether the restrictions that
the DSGE model imposes on the VAR do good or
harm when forecasting. Table 1 addresses this ques-
tion and shows that by and large the DSGE prior is
useful in terms of forecasting over a VAR with no
priors. The table shows the percentage improve-
ment in forecast accuracy relative to an unrestricted
VAR for horizons from one to sixteen quarters ahead.10
The forecast accuracy is measured as the root mean
squared error of the forecast using a rolling sample
from 1975Q3 to 2003Q3, a period that includes a
number of recessions. At each point in the rolling
sample, we estimate the model using eighty obser-
vations (say, at the first date in the rolling sample,
we use data from 1955Q4 to 1975Q3; at the second
date we use data from 1956Q1 to 1975Q4, etc.).11
The importance of the DSGE prior, λ, is chosen opti-
mally as described earlier. Of course, in principle the
optimal λ depends on the sample—that is, it might
change as we move from the beginning to the end of
the rolling sample. In practice, as expected, the opti-
mal λ was fairly constant over the rolling sample,
around 0.5. A value for λ of 0.5 means that we used
half as many artificial observations from the DSGE
model as the number of actual observations.
The numbers in Table 1 are positive whenever
the accuracy of DSGE-VAR is greater than that of
the unrestricted VAR. One can readily see that the
Horizon Real GDP Federal
(quarters) growth Inflation funds rate
1 17.4 8.4 7.3
2 17.0 7.2 5.0
4 15.1 8.8 5.0
6 14.1 10.5 6.6
8 12.4 11.5 8.4
10 14.4 12.3 8.2
12 15.1 12.6 6.4
14 16.2 13.0 6.1
16 19.1 13.2 5.8
Note: The rolling sample is 1975Q3 to 1997Q3 (ninety periods).
At each date in the sample, eighty observations are used to esti-
mate the VAR. The forecasts are computed based on the optimal
value of λ chosen ex ante.
TABLE 1
Percentage Gain in Root Mean Squared Error:
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standard benchmark, particularly for inflation but also
for real output growth. Of course, it would be inter-
esting to know how DSGE-VAR fares relative to
other benchmarks, such as FRB/US or commercial
models. At this stage, however, the comparison might
be premature, as these models are based on dozens
of variables while in the current application the
DSGE-VAR includes only three. In future research
we plan to apply the DSGE-VAR procedure to a more
sophisticated DSGE model, such as, for instance, the
one in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001).
The resulting application would then include enough
variables to make the comparison with FRB/US or
commercial models meaningful.
Policy Experiments with DSGE-VAR
F
or DSGE-VAR to be a useful tool for policy analy-
sis, being competitive in terms of forecasting is
not enough. DSGE-VAR needs to be able to address
policy questions such as the following: (1) What
would be the impact on real output growth and infla-
tion of a 50 basis point cut in the federal funds rate?
(2) What would be the impact on the volatility of
real output growth and inflation, and ultimately on
people’s welfare, of changing the policy rule followed
by the Federal Reserve?13
Models that can address the first type of ques-
tions are called “identified” in the literature. They
are so named because they are able to identify the
impact (impulse-response) of monetary policy shocks,
as distinguished from other disturbances in the econ-
omy, and therefore assess the consequence of a
shock that moves the federal funds rate down by
50 basis points. DSGE models are clearly identified.
To see what happens after a 50 basis point shock to
the variables of interest, one simply feeds a mone-
tary policy shock that generates a 50 point drop
in the federal funds rate into the model. Cowles
Commission–style models are also identified to the
extent that they contain an equation describing
monetary policy. As far as VARs are concerned, the
papers by Bernanke (1986) and Sims (1986) show
how to obtain such identification. Sims and Zha
(1998) extend this framework to BVARs, that is, to
VARs with priors. The next section discusses iden-
tification in the context of DSGE-VAR. 
The second question is different in nature from
the first one. The monetary policy shock of the
first question can be seen as a one-time distur-
bance that would not affect the view that market
participants have of the Fed. The shift in the pol-
icy rule of the second question is likely to affect
the view of market participants and their expecta-
tions. Because of the Lucas critique, the set of mod-
DSGE prior increases the forecasting performance
relative to that of an unrestricted VAR. All numbers
are positive and most of them are large, indicating a
substantial improvement in forecast accuracy.
Since unrestricted VARs are often overparameter-
ized, they are seldom used in practice for forecasting
because of the imprecision with which they are esti-
mated. The results in Table 1 are interesting because
they show that the restrictions coming from the
DSGE model can alleviate this problem. However,
from these results one still does not know whether
DSGE-VAR can be relied upon as a forecasting tool.
Hence, the second question we ask in this section
is, How does the accuracy of the forecasts from
DSGE-VAR compare with that of benchmark fore-
casting models? 
Table 2 addresses this question. The benchmark
chosen here is a VAR with a Minnesota prior, a stan-
dard one in the forecasting literature. The Minnesota
prior shrinks the parameter estimates of the VAR
toward a unit root in levels (or logarithmic levels).12
Unlike Table 1, Table 2 has both positive and negative
numbers, indicating that the VAR with a Minnesota
prior is a tougher competitor than the unrestricted
VAR. For federal funds rate forecasts, the VAR with
Minnesota prior has the upper hand. However, for
both inflation and output growth, DSGE-VAR gen-
erally outperforms the BVAR with a Minnesota prior
in terms of forecasting accuracy, and the gain gen-
erally increases with the forecast horizon. 
This section has shown that the DSGE-VAR fore-
casts can be regarded as competitive relative to a
Horizon Real GDP Federal
(quarters) growth Inflation funds rate
1 1.1 1.7 –7.6
2 7.0 1.3 –4.9
4 5.8 4.8 –1.9
6 3.5 7.2 –0.7
8 4.2 7.8 –0.2
10 8.0 8.4 –0.6
12 12.5 9.0 0.7
14 17.2 9.6 1.1
16 21.6 10.1 2.4
Note: The rolling sample is 1975Q3 to 1997Q3 (ninety periods).
At each date in the sample, eighty observations are used to esti-
mate the VAR. The forecasts are computed based on the optimal
values of λ and  ι (the weight of the prior in the BVAR with
Minnesota priors) chosen ex ante.
TABLE 2
Percentage Gain (Loss) in Root Mean 
Squared Error: DSGE-VAR versus BVAR 
with Minnesota Prior12. Since two of the variables, real output and the price level, enter the VAR as growth rates, in the equations corresponding to
these variables we shrink the coefficient on the first lag of the “own” variable toward zero. For instance, in the real output
equation we shrink the coefficient on the first lag of real output growth toward zero. This restriction corresponds to the unit
root in log level. In the equation corresponding to the federal funds rate, the prior on the first lag is one since this variable
enters as a level.
13. In asking this question we assume that the Federal Reserve implicitly follows a monetary policy rule, as in Taylor (1993).
Whether this is indeed the case is an issue beyond the scope of this paper.
14. See Leeper and Zha (2003) for an interesting analysis of what identified VARs can and cannot address.
15. Note that since var(U) = Σu, it must be the case that Ωvar(E)Ω′ = Σu. Because of this restriction, it is customary to decom-
pose Ω as Ω = chol(Σu)Ω*, where chol(Σu) is the Cholesky decomposition of Σu, Ω* is an orthonormal matrix, and var(E)
is the identity.
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els that can successfully address the second ques-
tion grows thinner relative to those that address
the first question. This is not to say that Cowles
Commission–style models and VARs cannot suc-
cessfully address any policy-shift type of ques-
tion.14 However, there are some regime shifts that
these models may not be able to address. DSGE-VAR
addresses regime shifts, trying to strike a balance
between the forecasting accuracy of BVARs and
the compliance to the Lucas critique of DSGE mod-
els. An example of the resulting procedure is dis-
cussed later in the article.
Identification
T
o understand how identification works in the
DSGE-VAR procedure, one may find it helpful to
review the identification problem in standard VARs
(see Hamilton 1994, chap. 11). The problem is as fol-
lows: One can easily estimate the variance-covariance
matrix of the VAR innovations U in equation (1),
which we called Σu. The problem is that these inno-
vations do not have an economic interpretation: They
are not shocks to monetary policy, technology, or
government spending, etc. One would like to have a
mapping—call it Ω—between these economically
interpretable shocks, which we call E, and the shocks
that we cannot interpret, U:
(9) U = ΩE.
With Ω in hand, it is straightforward to compute
impulse responses to, say, monetary policy shocks,
which are one of the elements of E. Using equa-
tion (9), one can feed monetary policy shocks into U
and then use equation (1) to feed the U shock into
the variables of interest, the Ys. The identification
problem is that Ω cannot in general be recovered
from the data.15 Identified VARs address this prob-
lem by imposing restrictions (zero restrictions, sign
restrictions, etc.) on the matrix Ω. The approach
taken here is to learn about Ω from the DSGE model
at hand, consistent with the rest of the procedure.
Once we learn about Ω, the impulse responses are
obtained from equation (1) using Φλ(θ)DSGE-VAR as the
parameter estimate.
For the sake of simplicity, we do not delve into the
technical details of the identification procedure (see
Del Negro and Schorfheide, forthcoming, section 4.3).
A comment about the role of λ in the identification
procedure is in order, however. As λ increases,
DSGE-VAR will tend to coincide with the VAR approx-
imation of the DSGE model. Hence, the impulse
responses from DSGE-VAR will become closer and
closer to those from the DSGE model. Figure 1 makes
this point visually. The figure plots the impulse
responses of (cumulative) real output growth, infla-
tion, and the federal funds rate to a monetary policy
shock. The impulse responses are based on the
sample 1981Q4–2001Q3. The gold lines in the plot
are the impulse responses for the DSGE model, the
solid black lines are the mean impulse responses
for DSGE-VAR, and the dashed lines are 90 percent
confidence bands, which measure the uncertainty
surrounding the estimates for the impulse responses.
One can readily see that as λ increases from 0.5 to 5,
the mean impulse responses for DSGE-VAR move
closer to the DSGE model’s impulse responses, and
the bands narrow.
In our procedure λ is computed endogenously
and measures the extent to which we can trust the
DSGE model used as a prior. We therefore view pos-
itively the fact that the identification procedure
In the best of all possible worlds we would
have a DSGE model that forecasts well, so
we could forget the VAR correction.44 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2003
As described in the model section, the identified
shocks are (1) monetary policy shocks, εRt; (2) gov-
ernment spending shocks, gt; and (3) technology
shocks, zt. To describe the findings in Figure 2, it is
necessary to discuss the impulse response functions
with respect to these shocks, plotted in Figure 3.
Impulse response functions simply trace the impact
of a one-standard-deviation shock on the variables
of interest. A one-standard-deviation shock can be
interpreted as the average shock. The impulse
responses in Figure 3 are obtained for a value of λ
equal to 1, which is the same value under which the
identified shocks in Figure 2 are obtained. Although
the impulse responses change with λ, as shown in
Figure 1, the overall conclusions of this exercise are
fairly robust to the choice of λ. As in Figure 1, the
gold lines in the plot are the impulse responses for
the DSGE model, the solid black lines are the mean
hinges on λ: The higher λ, the more we feel confi-
dent about the DSGE model at hand and the more
reasonable it becomes to use it as a base for identi-
fication. Our approach therefore complements the
existing literature, where economic theory is often
used as an implicit metric to decide whether a given
identification procedure works or not.
We now use the identification in DSGE-VAR to
address an issue that is relevant to the current pol-
icy discussion: What shocks hit the economy during
the past four years and, in particular, during the
recession? Was the recession the result of monetary
policy shocks, as some have claimed, or was it the
result of technology or other shocks? Figure 2 plots
the time paths of the identified shocks—that is, the
E variables in equation (9)—as well as the actual
paths of the variables entering the VAR: real output
growth, inflation, and the federal funds rate. 
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Impulse Response Functions to Monetary Policy Shocks
Notes: The solid black lines represent the posterior means of the VAR impulse response functions. The dashed lines are 90 percent
confidence bands. The gold lines represent the mean impulse responses from the DSGE model. The impulse responses are based on
the sample 1983Q3 to 2003Q2.45 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2003
impulse responses for DSGE-VAR, and the dashed
lines are 90 percent confidence bands. 
The impulse responses of output, inflation, and
interest rates to a monetary policy shock conform
to well-known patterns. A one-standard-deviation
shock raises the federal funds rate by 25–30 basis
points, decreases real output growth, and lowers
inflation (by convention, here a positive monetary
policy shock is contractionary). Note that the
response of output in DSGE-VAR is more persis-
tent than in the model. The impulse responses to
a government shock deserve more explanation
because what is called a government shock in the
model is not what people generally have in mind. In
the model, a positive government shock is essen-
tially equivalent to a shock to the marginal utility of
consumption: For given output, an increase in gov-
ernment spending reduces the resources available
from consumption and hence increases the marginal
utility of consumption. 
The increase in the marginal utility of consump-
tion has two effects. On the cost side, it lowers the
real wage and hence the marginal cost faced by
firms because in equilibrium the real wage is
inversely proportional to the marginal utility of con-
sumption: Since agents value their wages more, all
else being equal, they need to be paid less. In sticky
price models, a decrease in the marginal cost paid
by the firm has the effect of lowering inflation. This
reasoning explains the negative impact of a govern-
ment shock on inflation. On the supply side, the
other effect of an increase in the marginal utility of
consumption is an increase in output: Again, since
agents value output more, they have an incentive to
produce more. This reasoning explains the positive
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Real GDP Growth, Inflation, the Federal Funds Rate, and Identified Shocks from the DSGE-VAR
Notes: The solid lines in the three upper plots represent the posterior means of the identified shocks from the DSGE-VAR
(1999Q2–2003Q2). The dashed lines are 90 percent confidence bands. The sold lines in the three lower plots represent the actual paths
of real GDP growth, inflation, and the federal funds rate. The estimates are based on the sample 1983Q3 to 2003Q2.46 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2003
indicates that by and large such shocks were not
responsible for the last recession. It is true that before
the recession most monetary policy shocks were
positive (contractionary), but they were fairly small.
After the start of the recession, most monetary policy
shocks were negative, indicating an accommodative
monetary policy stance. In particular, according to
the model the beginning of 2001 witnessed two large
expansionary shocks.
The driving forces of the recession, according to
the model, were technology shocks. Figure 2 shows
that technology shocks were positive in 1999 but then
turned negative, and sizably so, in 2000 and 2001.
The only large positive technology shock was asso-
ciated with the output rebound in the first quarter
of 2002. Finally, government spending shocks were
negligible up to the third quarter of 2001, when a
large positive shock occurred, associated with the
rate, which is in any case fairly small. The response
of the federal funds rate simply mirrors the decline
in inflation as it feeds through the Taylor rule. In
summary, positive (negative) government spending
shocks in the model look very much like positive
(negative) oil price shocks, which drive inflation
down (up) and output up (down). Finally, technol-
ogy shocks drive output up. Since the technology
shocks in the model are permanent, the increase in
output is permanent as well. The impact on inflation
is negligible and insignificant.
The shocks plotted in the three upper panels of
Figure 2 are measured in terms of standard devia-
tions: A value of 1 (–1) indicates a positive (negative)
shock of one standard deviation. In interpreting the
plots, one must bear in mind that shocks between
–1 and 1 are the norm while shocks outside this range
are the exception. The path of monetary policy shocks
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Impulse Response Functions to All Shocks
Notes: The solid black lines represent the posterior means of the DSGE-VAR impulse response functions for λ = 1. The dashed lines are 90
percent confidence bands. The gold lines represent the mean impulse responses from the DSGE model. The impulse responses are based
on the sample 1983Q3 to 2003Q2.47 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2003
sharp decline in inflation. As Figure 2 shows, gov-
ernment spending shocks have the largest impact
on inflation. The recent decline in inflation, result-
ing from the decline in energy prices, is also associ-
ated with a positive government spending shock.
This result is not surprising because the effect of
government spending shocks in the model is similar
to the perceived effect of oil shocks in reality, as
discussed above. As energy shocks are not part of
the model, their effect is likely attributed to gov-
ernment spending shocks. This remark underscores
that the analysis just conducted is in many ways
heroic because it is done with a very stylized model
and using only a few variables. Yet the purpose of the
analysis was to illustrate how, in general, DSGE-VAR




his section describes how DSGE-VAR works
under a hypothetical policy experiment. Let us
put ourselves in the shoes of Paul Volcker as he
took office as chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board at the end of the second quarter of 1979.
Suppose that he had two options: of being either
soft on inflation (labeled policy A) or tough on infla-
tion (labeled policy B). In terms of the Taylor rule
in equation (8), policy A corresponds to a low reac-
tion to deviations of inflation from target in the
Taylor rule (a low value for ψ1, say, ψ1 = 1.1) while
policy B corresponds to a high value for ψ1 (say,
ψ1 = 1.7).16 In this hypothetical policy experiment,
Chairman Volcker uses macroeconomic stability—
measured by the standard deviations of output
growth, inflation, and the interest rate in the next
twenty years—as the criterion to choose between
policies A and B. 
To understand how the policy experiment under
DSGE-VAR works, it is instructive to see how it
would work under a DSGE model. Recall that θ is
the vector of deep parameters and that ψ1 is one of
the elements of this vector. Let us assume that the
only difference between policy A and B lies in the
choice of ψ1. To perform the policy experiment
under a DSGE model, one would estimate the
remaining elements of θ using pre-1979Q3 data.
Call θp, p = A, B the vector of deep parameters cor-
responding to policies A and B. One would then use
the DSGE model to make twenty-year forecasts for
the variables of interest and, finally, compute the
standard deviation of the forecast paths. To the
extent that the dynamics of the DSGE model are
reasonably well approximated by a VAR, the fore-
casts can be obtained from a vector autoregression
with coefficients:
(10) Φλ=∞(θp)DSGE-VAR =                              , 
for p = A, B.
Note that in equation (10) the second moments
Γ*
xx(θp) and Γ*
xy(θp) are computed in full compli-
ance with the Lucas critique. That is, these second
moments reflect the fact that agents would behave
differently when policy moves from A to B. 
To perform the policy experiment under the
DSGE-VAR procedure, one would estimate the
vector of deep parameters θ using pre-1979Q3 data
as described earlier in the article. One would then
replace the estimate of ψ1 with the values 1.1 for
policy A and 1.7 for policy B and obtain twenty-year
forecasts for the variables of interest using equa-
tion (5), which is shown below written in a slightly
different way:
Φλ(θp)DSGE-VAR =                                 
p = A, B, where Y and X represent the pre-1979Q3
data. Note that the second moments computed
from the data, (X′X)/T and (X′Y)/T, do not depend
on policy and do not reflect the change in the
agent’s behavior resulting from the policy shift. This
outcome implies that policy experiments under the
DSGE-VAR procedure are in full compliance with
the Lucas critique only in the λ = ∞ case. For λ less
than infinity, the backward-looking components
(X′X)/T and (X′Y)/T are still present. To the extent
that the DSGE model does not fit the data well enough,
these terms work as a data-driven “correction” to
achieve a good forecasting performance. Clearly, in
the best of all possible worlds we would have a DSGE
model that forecasts well, so we could set λ = ∞ and
forget the backward-looking correction. 
The remainder of the section shows the results
of the Volcker policy experiment. Figure 4 plots the
distributions of outcomes according to policies A
and B. Since the assumed criterion of choice is
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16. The values of ψ1 used in the two policy regimes are broadly consistent with estimated Taylor-rule inflation coefficients
obtained over pre- and post-Volcker sample periods by authors such as Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000).48 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2003
of λ that are between 0 and ∞. Each entry of the
matrix plots the standard deviation of the corre-
sponding macroeconomic variable according to
option A (solid black line) and option B (gold line).
For each plot the vertical line shows what actually
occurred from 1982Q4 to 1999Q2.17
Notice first that when the DSGE model is not
used (first row, λ = 0) the black and gold lines over-
lap since the effect of the policy change is embodied
only in the artificial data (the Γ*
xx(θp) and Γ*
xy(θp)
terms), which have no weight in this case. As the
weight of the artificial data (λ) increases, the pre-
dictions from policy A and policy B start to diverge.
The forecasts suggest that policy B (tough on infla-
ested in are the standard deviations of the variables of
interest. Remember that for each policy option there
is not only one possible outcome but a whole distrib-
ution of outcomes, reflecting the uncertainty about
the parameters of the model as well the shocks that
may hit the economy. Figure 4 is organized as a
matrix. The columns of the matrix correspond to real
output growth, inflation, and the interest rate, respec-
tively. The rows of the matrix correspond to the
relative weight of artificial versus actual data in the
augmented sample. The first row (λ = 0) uses only
actual data: This amounts to using the unrestricted
VAR only. The last row (λ = ∞) uses the DSGE model
only. The rows in between show the results for values









012 0 1 2 0 5 1 0
012 0 1 2 0 5 1 0
012 0 1 2 0 5 1 0
012 0 1 2 0 5 1 0

























































Effects of a Policy Regime Shift
Notes: The vertical lines correspond to the sample standard deviation of the actual data from 1982Q4 to 1999Q2. The solid black and gold
lines are posterior predictive distributions of sample standard deviations for the same time period, obtained using data up to 1979Q2. The
solid black line corresponds to ψ1 = 1.1; the gold line corresponds to ψ1 = 1.7.17. Following Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), we compute the actual excluding the pre-1983 disinflation period.
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tion) delivers lower variability in both inflation and
the interest rate than does policy A (soft on inflation):
The gold densities are shifted to the left of, and are
narrower than, the black densities. Interestingly, pol-
icy B delivers not only a lower variability in inflation,
as expected, but also a lower variability of interest
rates in spite of the fact that the interest rate reacts
more, and not less, to inflation under policy B. This
effect works through agents’ expectations: Since
agents expect monetary policy to reign in inflation
under policy B, they will expect lower inflation vari-
ability. Their expectations will be realized, and in
equilibrium the interest rate will not have to move
much. In other words, the threat to react to inflation
is enough to lower inflation variability, avoiding wide
swings in interest rates.
Although this is a one-time experiment and not a
test of the forecasting accuracy of the model, it is
interesting to consider how accurate the predictions
from DSGE-VAR are in this case. Again, for each plot
the dotted vertical lines correspond to the sample
standard deviation of the actual data from 1982Q4 to
1999Q2. As far as output is concerned, there is no dif-
ference across policies. This result is expected
because the difference between policy A and policy B
regards the response to inflation and not to output.
Not surprisingly, both models overpredict the stan-
dard deviation of real output growth: Both the para-
meters of the BVAR and those of the DSGE model are
estimated using data up to 1979, that is, a period in
which real output volatility was higher than in the
1980s and 1990s. In terms of inflation, policy B is
clearly more on target than policy A is, as it should
be since the Taylor rule parameters in policy B are
broadly consistent with estimated coefficients
obtained over the post-Volcker sample period. Pol-
icy A overpredicts the variability of inflation. Also,
its  forecasts are much more uncertain than those
from policy B. For interest rate prediction, for high
values of λ policy B appears to underpredict the
volatility of the federal funds rate. Policy A, on the
other hand, tends to overpredict the rate’s volatil-
ity. As discussed earlier, the current application of




his article describes the workings of DSGE-VAR,
a procedure that aims to combine VARs and
DSGE models. The ultimate goal of the procedure is
to provide a proper assessment of the impact of dif-
ferent monetary policy rules and at the same time
provide a tool that can also be relied upon for fore-
casting. It may well be that in the not-too-distant
future a full-fledged DSGE model will attain both
goals. In the meanwhile, DSGE-VAR may provide a
viable alternative to the models that are currently in
use for forecasting and policy analysis. 
REFERENCES
Altug, Sumru. 1989. Time-to-build and aggregate fluctua-
tions: Some new evidence. International Economic
Review 30, no. 4:889–920.
Bernanke, Ben S. 1986. Alternative explanations of the
money-income correlation. Carnegie-Rochester Series
on Public Policy 25 (Autumn): 49–99.
Brayton, Flint, Andrew Levin, Ralph Tryon, and John C.
Williams. 1997. The evolution of macro models at the
Federal Reserve Board. Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series on Public Policy 47 (December): 43–81. 
Brayton, Flint, Eileen Mauskopf, Dave Reifschneider,
Peter Tinsley, and John Williams. 1997. The role of
expectations in the FRB/US macroeconomic model.
Federal Reserve Bulletin 83 (April): 227–45.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles
L. Evans. 2001. Nominal rigidities and the dynamic effects
of a shock to monetary policy. Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago Working Paper 2001-08.
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler. 2000.
Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability:
Evidence and some theory. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 115, no. 1:147–80.
Del Negro, Marco, and Frank Schorfheide. Forthcoming.
Priors from general equilibrium models for VARs.
International Economic Review.
Diebold, Francis X. 1998. The past, present, and future
of macroeconomic forecasting. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 12 (Spring): 175–92.
Doan, Thomas, Robert Litterman, and Christopher A.
Sims. 1984. Forecasting and conditional projections using
realistic prior distributions. Econometric Reviews 3, 
no. 1:1–100.
Fair, Ray. 1992. The Cowles Commission approach, real
business cycle theories, and new Keynesian economics.
Yale University, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper
No. 1004.50 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2003
Reifschneider, David L., David J. Stockton, and David W.
Wilcox. 1997. Econometric models and the monetary
policy process. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series
on Public Policy 47 (December): 1–37.
Robertson, John C., and Ellis W. Tallman. 1999. Vector
autoregressions: Forecasting and reality. Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta Economic Review 84 (First Quarter):
4–18.
Sargent, Thomas J. 1984. Autoregressions, expectations,
and advice. American Economic Review 74, no. 2:408–15.
Schorfheide, Frank. 2000. Loss function-based evalua-
tion of DSGE models. Journal of Applied Econometrics
15 (November–December): 645–70.
Sims, Christopher A. 1980. Macroeconomics and reality.
Econometrica 48 (January): 1–48.
———. 1982. Policy analysis with econometric models.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1:107–64.
———. 1986. Are forecasting models usable for policy
analysis? Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quar-
terly Review 10 (Winter): 2–16.
———. 2002. The role of models and probabilities in the
monetary policy process. Brooking Papers on Economic
Activity 2:1–40.
Sims, Christopher A., and Tao Zha. 1998. Bayesian meth-
ods for dynamic multivariate models. International
Economic Review 39, no. 4:949–68.
Smith, Anthony A., Jr. 1993. Estimating nonlinear time-
series models using simulated vector autoregressions.
Journal of Applied Econometrics 8:S63–S84.
Taylor, John B. 1993. Discretion versus policy rules in
practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on
Public Policy 39:195–214.
Theil, Henry, and Arthur S. Goldberger. 1961. On pure
and mixed estimation in economics. International
Economic Review 2:65–78.
Zha, Tao. 1998. A dynamic multivariate model for use 
in formulating policy. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Economic Review 83 (First Quarter): 16–29.
Hamilton, James D. 1994. Time series analysis. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Hodrick, Robert J., and Edward C. Prescott. 1997. Postwar
U.S. business cycles: An empirical investigation. Journal
of Money, Credit, and Banking 29, no. 1:1–16.
Ingram, Beth F., and Charles H. Whiteman. 1994.
Supplanting the “Minnesota” prior: Forecasting macro-
economic time series using real business cycle model
priors. Journal of Monetary Economics 34 (Decem-
ber): 497–510. 
Ireland, Peter N. 1997. A small, structural, quarterly model
for monetary policy evaluation. Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy 47 (December):
83–108.
Kydland, Finn E., and Edward C. Prescott. 1982. Time 
to build and aggregate fluctuations. Econometrica 50
(November): 1345–70.
———. 1996. The computational experiment: An econo-
metric tool. Journal of Economic Perspectives 10
(Winter): 69–85.
Leeper, Eric M., and Christopher A. Sims. 1994. Toward
a modern macroeconomic model usable for policy analy-
sis. NBER macroeconomics annual. Cambridge and
London: MIT Press.
Leeper, Eric M., Christopher A. Sims, and Tao Zha. 1996.
What does monetary policy do? Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 2:1–78.
Leeper, Eric M., and Tao Zha. 2003. Modest policy
interventions. Journal of Monetary Economics 50
(November): 1673–1700.
Litterman, Robert B. 1986. Forecasting with Bayesian vec-
tor autoregressions—five years of experience. Journal of
Business and Economic Statistics 4 (January): 25–38.
Lucas, Robert E. 1976. Econometric policy evaluation:
A critique. In The Phillips curve and the labor mar-
ket, edited by Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer. Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series 1. Amsterdam: North-
Holland.